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INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES - PRESENT ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT INTEREST PLACED IN
PROPER ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE
JAMES

I.

T.

HALVERSON*

INTRODUCTION

T IS not the purpose of this article to reappraise whether there ought
to be legislation such as section 8 of the Clayton Act', prohibiting,
on a per se basis, horizontal director interlocks. The relevance of the
per se application of that statute 2 to today's corporate realities has been
questioned 3 and may indeed be a subject deserving of analysis, but on
the assumption that congressional modification of the per se operation
of section 8 is unlikely, this article considers whether the extension of
section 8 to reach indirect and/or vertical interlocks is warranted.
II.

THE INTERLOCK CONTROVERSY

Different types of corporate interlocks and their effects on competition are perhaps the least understood relationships in the history
of antitrust law enforcement. This is not to say that no thought or
scholarship has been devoted to the subject. It is known that interlocks of various types exist between firms which compete with one
* B.A., Harvard College, 1962; LL.B., Harvard University, 1965. Member,
District of Columbia, Minnesota, and New York Bars. The author wishes to thank
Mr. Kenneth S. Prince for his assistance in the preparation of this article.

1. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1970). The relevant language of section 8 states:
No person at the same time shall be a director in any two or more
corporations, any one of which has capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating more than $1,000,000, engaged in whole or in part in commerce, other
than banks, banking associations, trust companies, and common carriers subject
to the Act to regulate commerce . . . if such corporations are or shall have

been theretofore, by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors,
so that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would
constitute a violation of any of the provisions of any of the antitrust laws.
The eligibility of a director under the foregoing provision shall be determined by
the aggregate amount of the capital, surplus, and undivided profits, exclusive
of dividends declared but not paid to stockholders, at the end of the fiscal year
of said corporation next preceding the election of directors, and when a director
has been elected in accordance with the provisions of this Act it shall be lawful
for him to continue as such for one year thereafter.
Id.
2. See note 26 and accompanying text infra.
3. See note 25 infra.

(393)
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another, firms which are suppliers and customers of one another in
particular markets, and firms which finance competitors. Over the
years, many surveys have been taken and a number of articles have
been written on the subject, but despite this attention, efforts to understand the actual effects of these relationships and their .impact, if any,
on competition have been largely unsuccessful.4
In fact, a survey of the literature quickly reveals that much of the
discussion on interlocking relationships is intuitive and predicated on
what -is considered to be common-sense observation or the self-evident
conclusions of an analysis of the structure of organizations with management interlocks. The critics of interlocks object to these relationships on four broad grounds: first, they are believed to have serious
antitrust (anticompetitive) implications;' second, they are thought to
involve directors in conflicts of interest;' third, they may diminish
4. The Temporary National Economic Committee on the Concentration of
Economic Power commenced an investigation of the effects of interlocking arrangements in 1938, but the study fell short of its objective presumably because of the
redirection of economic effort during World War II. See S. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1941). An important study by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
which was issued in 1951, summarized many of the theories and assumptions which
underlie the notion that interlocks of all types adversely affect competition. See
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES, H.P.. Doc. No.
652, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1951) [hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT]. The report did
not, however, purport to demonstrate actual instances of competitive abuses. The
report did document widespread existence of interlocks, many of which were vertical
and indirect interlocking directorates. See id. A vertical interlock is one existing
between two companies who occupy a vertical market relationship with respect to
each other, e.g., customer-supplier. See text accompanying notes 35-45 infra. An
example of an indirect interlock is where two competitors are interlocked through
a financial institution, because one or more directors of each competitor is also a
director of the financial institution. See text accompanying notes 46 & 47 infra.
Section 8 of the Clayton Act only reaches direct interlocking directorates between
competitors. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1970). This proscribed relationship is often referred
to as a horizontal interlock. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS 103 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS].
A later congressional report noted that "as of this time, there are virtually
no factual analyses of how interlocking business organizations deal with particular
transactions and the social and economic impact of such transactions." STAFF OF THE
ANTITRUST SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT 6 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter cited as
INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT].

Nevertheless, the scope of the report was

limited to analysis of the frequency with which the interlocking directorate device
appeared in the structure of corporate management. Id. at 229. This survey, like
so many which preceded it, did not attempt to analyze effects on particular transactions
or behavioral characteristics in corporate operations resulting from management
interlocks. Id. See also SUBCOMMS. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, AND BUDGETING,

MANAGEMENT,

AND

EXPENDITURE

OF

THE

SENATE

COMM.

ON

GOVERNMENT

OPERATIONS, DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP, S. Doc. No. 93-62, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter cited as DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP].

5. INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT, supra note 4, at 7.

6. See

M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH OR REALITY
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the opportunities for advancement by young managers ;7 and fourth,
they debase the quality of business management by spreading the
interlocked director's attention to so many matters that he is unable to
serve effectively on any board.' Whether or not corporate interlocks
-tend to create the three latter undesirable effects is an issue which
this article is not intended to address. Rather, it is from the standpoint of antitrust enforcement policy that this article approaches the
interlocking directorate debate. It is important, therefore, to examine
the actual or potential anticompetitive implications of interlocking
directorates and to explore why there appear to be many unanswered
questions in this area which cannot be resolved without a better understanding of the facts than is presently available from published studies.
A.

Laws Affecting Interlocking Arrangements

Federal legislation dealing with corporate interlocks is a tapestry
of inconsistent provisions governing a variety of intercorporate relationships. In some regulated industries, certain types of horizontal
interlocks may be prohibited by an appropriate federal agency.9 In
other industries, horizontal and vertical interlocks may be proscribed.' °
7. In his address to Congress urging the passage of strict interlock legislation,
President Wilson predicted the following advantage that would be gained from
such legislation:
It will open the field of industrial development and organization to scores of
men who have been obliged to serve when their abilities entitled them to direct.
It will immensely hearten the young men coming on and will greatly enrich
the business activities of the whole country.
H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1914).
8. INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT, supra note 4, at 8.
9. Horizontal interlocks between railroads and competitive common carriers
by water, operated through the Panama Canal or elsewhere, may be prohibited by
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). Section 11 of the Panama Canal Act,
49 U.S.C. § 5(14) (1970). The ICC may prohibit or approve horizontal interlocks
between those common carriers subject to its regulation. Section 439(12) of the
Transportation Act of 1920, 49 U.S.C. § 20a(12) (1970). Horizontal interlocks between
telephone and telegraph common carriers are prohibited unless approved by the Federal
Communications Commission. Section 212 of the Communications Act of 1934, 47
U.S.C. § 212 (1970) ; see INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT, supra note 4, at 11.
10. Vertical and horizontal interlocks between securities underwriters and
national banks are subject to Federal Reserve Board regulation. Section 32 of the
National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1970). Horizontal interlocks between electrical
utilities, and vertical interlocks between electrical suppliers to, or securities underwriters for, such utilities are within the control of the Federal Power Commission.
Section 305 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825(d) (b) (1970). The Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) has cognizance over vertical interlocks between
public utiltity holding companies and banks, trust companies, investment bankers,
and banking associations. Section 17 of the Public Utilities Holding Company Act
of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79q(c) (1970). The Secretary of the Treasury may approve
vertical and horizontal interlocks between companies in the liquor industry. Section
8 of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. § 208(a) (1970). Vertical
and horizontal interlocks affecting common carriers or manufacturers engaged in
any phase of aeronautics are subject to the jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics
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Under section 8 of the Clayton Act, interlocking directorates and interlocking officers of banks are forbidden in certain instances unless
permitted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System."
The interlock legislation which affects the greatest number of corporations, however, is embodied in the proscription in section 8 of the
Clayton Act of interlocking directorates between competing corporations if one of the corporations has capital, surplus, and undivided profits
aggregating more than $1 million and if the elimination of competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any
2
of the provisions of the antitrust laws.1
B.

Historical Debate over Interlocks

Section 8 was enacted in 1914 as part of President Wilson's
package to deal with what Justice Brandeis had described earlier in a
series of articles as "the money trust" or the "inner group.' 3 These
Board. Section 409 of the Federal Aviation Program, 49 U.S.C. § 1379(a) (1970)
(replaced the Civil Aeronautics Act of June 23, 1938, ch. 601, § 408(a), 52 Stat. 1001).
The SEC has cognizance of certain horizontal interlocks between investment companies, and certain vertical links between investment companies and investment
advisers, banks and securities underwriters. Section 10 of the Investment Company
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1970). Section 10 of the Clayton Act prohibits common
carriers from having any dealings with a firm which has specifically identified
employees on the common carrier board, unless the firm has made the most favorable
offer on a competitive bid basis. 15 U.S.C. § 20 (1970) ; see INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE
MANAGEMENT, supra note 4, at 11.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1970).
12. For the pertinent language of section 8, see note 1 supra.
13. See Brandeis, Breaking the Money Trusts, HARPERS WEEKLY, Nov. 22, 1913,
at 10; id., Nov. 29, 1913, at 9; id., Dec. 6, 1913, at 13; id., Dec. 13, 1913, at 10;
id., Dec. 20, 1913, at 10; id., Dec. 27, 1913, at 18; id., Jan. 3, 1914, at 11; id., Jan. 10,
1914, at 18; id., Jan. 17, 1914, at 18. Public concern about corporate interlocks has,
in the past, tended to be cyclical. In the early part of the 20th century, the abuses
of the large trusts and the complex network of intercorporate relationships convinced
many observers that there was a core group made up of a handful of financiers and
industrialists who controlled a vast portion of the economic wealth of the nation.
Congressional investigations in 1887, 1912, and 1913 uncovered evidence that interlocking corporate managements were widespread and had, in some instances, been
used as a vehicle for inside dealings for personal gain, for exclusive or preferential
treatment of favored suppliers or customers, and had given rise to serious conflicts of
interest among interlocking directors. See PACIFIC RAILWAY COMMISSION, S. EXEC.
[hereinafter cited as PETTIsoN REPORT];
STEEL CORP., H.R. REP. No. 1127, 62d Cong.,
as STANLEY REPORT] ; HOUSE Comm. ON BANKING

Doc. No. 51, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1887)
INVESTIGATION

1st Sess. (1912)

OF UNITED

STATES

[hereinafter cited

AND CURRENCY, INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION OF CONTROL OF MONEY AND CREDIT,

H.R. REP. No. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. (1913) (Pujo Report) [hereinafter cited as
INVESTIGATION OF CONCENTRATION]. Publication of the congressional reports on these
investigations, capped by the series of Brandeis articles and the public speeches of
President Wilson, generated public antipathy for interlocks which led, in 1914, to the
enactment of section 8 of the Clayton Act, forbidding certain bank interlocks and
horizontal interlocks between competing nonbanking corporations. 15 U.S.C. § 19
(1970).
While the history of the period between 1912
and 1915 reflects intense public
awareness about the problems of interlocking directorates, since that time there have

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss3/2
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labels were pinned on a group of individuals who were suspected of
controlling a vast amount of -the nation's capital resources. The alleged
anticompetitive designs of the "money trust" were thought to be implemented through the means of the interlock. 4 President Wilson
thought this group might have the power and potential to destroy
genuine economic freedom,' 5 while Justice Brandeis attempted to
focus public attention more specifically on the competitive abuses as
well as the conflicts of interest problems which had been identified
as the fruits of widespread interlocking directorates. 6
There was some evidence in earlier congressional investigations
tending to support the arguments of President Wilson and Justice
Brandeis. For example, the Pettison Report had disclosed significant
abuses in railroad construction, lease, and repair contracts, allegedly
attributable to four Central Pacific Railroad Company directors who
also controlled the corporations which were parties to the contracts
with the Central Pacific.' Subsequent reports, of the Pujo Committee' and the Stanley Committee,' 9 revealed further instances in
which anticompetitive practices were implemented through the vehicle
of interlocking directorates." ° These reports provided the impetus for the
advocates of reform and made important contributions to the develop21
ment and passage of section 8 of the Clayton Act over 60 years ago..
been other periods in which interlocking directorates have come under close scrutiny,
notably in the late 1940's and early 1950's when the FTC and the Department of
Justice stepped up their respective enforcement activities. See, e.g., United States
v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Union Bag & Paper
Corp, 52 F.T.C. 1278 (1956).
14. See Brandeis, supra note 13, Dec. 6, 1913, at 13-15, where the author concluded that the practice of interlocking directorates "is the most potent instrument
of the Money Trust." Id. at 13.
15. See H.R. REP. No. 627, supra note 7, at 18.
16. See Brandeis, supra note 13, Dec. 6, 1913, at 13-15.
17. PETTISON REPORT, supra note 13, vol. 1, at 143.
18. See note 13 supra.
19. Id.
20. The Stanley Report noted:
This record is replete with instances of the pernicious effect sometimes upon
the Steel Corporation itself, and more often upon the public generally, of this
interlocking of directorates.
The enormous sum paid for the properties of the Lake Superior Consolidated
Iron Mines and the manifestly excessive sum for the Troy Steel Products Co.,
with rebates on purchases of supplies by the International Harvester Co. and
the American Tin Can Co. at greatly reduced rates; the complicated web of
agreements in restraint of competition, low costs in sliding-scale contracts, and
the huge sums paid Mr. H. C. Frick and others in the absorption of the UnionSharon Steel Co.; the inordinate sums paid to promoters and underwriters are
concrete instances of abuses directly traceable to this community of interest
between a few powerful individuals in control of a number of great corporations.
STANLEY REPORT, supra note 13, at 209-10.
21. See note 12, supra.
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In his message to Congress on the subject of trusts and monopolies, President Wilson had asked for a law which would
"effectually prohibit and prevent such interlockings of the personnel of the directorates of great corporations .. . as in effect

result in making those who borrow and those who lend practically
one and the same, those who sell and those who buy but the same
persons trading with one another under different names and in
different combinations, and those who affect to compete in fact
partners and masters of some whole field of business." 22
It is apparent that President Wilson wanted legislation which would
cover vertical as well as horizontal interlocking relationships, that he
was concerned with interlocks between banks and other types of corporations, and that he objected to interlocks which were established
by directors and those which were created by other corporate employees as well. Despite the efforts of the President to promote a
statutory design which would deal broadly with the alleged interlocks
abuses uncovered in these early studies, the legislation which emerged
from Congress was more limited in scope than he had envisioned.
Section 8 of the Clayton Act only covered director interlocks between
competitors, 23 and thus fell far short of the objective President Wilson
had in mind.24
III.

EFFECTIVENESS

OF SECTION

8

The version of section 8 which finally became the law in 1914
has been the target of sharp criticism ever since its enactment.2" Law
enforcement authorities quickly discovered that, despite its per se
22. H.R. REP. No. 627, supra note 7, at 18.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1970). For the pertinent language of section 8, see note 1

supra.
24. At least one commentator has suggested that the reason President Wilson
approved this watered-down version of section 8 is that he had redirected the thrust
of his antitrust program to the establishment of the FTC. Travers, Interlocks in
Corporate Management and the Antitrust Laws, 46 TEXAS L. REV. 819, 831-32 (1968).
Professor Travers noted:
Many persons who understood the interlock problem and who might otherwise
have worked to amend the Clayton bill may have felt that a bitter struggle to
broaden the coverage of the Clayton bill would be unduly costly since the
commission could handle any interlock not covered as an "unfair method of
competition."
Id. at 831-32.
25. See, e.g., Hearings on Corporate Disclosure Before the Subcomm. on Budgeting, Management, and Expenditures and the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2,
at 897-912 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Corporate Disclosure]; Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 1, pt. 2, 21, 26-46 (1951) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on Monopoly Power].
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character, 6 section 8 was so fraught with loopholes and so easily
evaded that it was hardly worth the allocation of resources required
to enforce it. 27 Instead of prosecuting violations, a technique of "jawboning" directors into dissolving illegal horizontal interlocks was
found to be effective.2 Apparently, however, this technique lacked
the accompanying deterrent impact that formal prosecution possessed. 9
26. See United States v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y.
1953). In Sears, the Government had brought a section 8 action, because a Sears
director also sat on the board of B. F. Goodrich Co. Id. at 615. Sears contended
that the enforcement of section 8 required a finding that a hypothetical merger
between the interlocked corporations would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). 111 F. Supp. at 616. The court rejected this argument
and held that if any potential agreement between the interlocked corporations would
be a per se violation of any of the antitrust laws, then the directorate interlock was
prohibited by section 8. Id. at 621.
27. Former FTC Chairman Mead's testimony in 1951 before the House Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power illustrates this problem:
[S]everal years ago the board of directors of General Steel Castings contained
the president and two vice-presidents of American Steel Foundries, all of whom
were also directors of the latter company and also contained the chairman of
the board and the president of Baldwin Locomotive, both of whom were also
directors of that company. When the Department of Justice questioned these
interlocking directorates, the directors from American Steel Foundries and Baldwin
withdrew from the General Steel Castings board. There is a catch. Their place
was taken by two vice-presidents of Baldwin Locomotive, but since none of
these officials was a director in any of these companies but General Steel
Castings, the new arrangement satisfied the requirements of Section 8 of the
Clayton Act. There is no reason to believe that the closeness of the executive
and policymaking ties between the three companies was in any way reduced by
the change.
Hearings on Monopoly Power,supra note 25, at 28.
From 1914 to 1965, the FTC had only filed a total of 13 complaints under
section 8 of the Clayton Act. Dooley, The Interlocking Directorates, 59 Am. EcoN.
R v. 314, 319 n.9 (1969).
28. In 1947 the Justice Department announced that it had conducted a survey
of interlocking directorates in which it found about 1,500 persons who were on the
board of more than one firm, and that most of the directors who were illegally
interlocked resigned without contest. Kramer, Interlocking Directorships and the
Clayton Act After 35 Years, 59 YALE L.J. 1266, 1270-71 (1950).
29. Among the resignations attributed to the Justice Department's announcement in 1947, three reportedly were submitted by directors on the board of General
Electric Co. who were also directors of competing corporations. Id. at 1271. On
November 26, 1973, the FTC accepted a consent order with General Electric Co.
which prohibited interlocking directorates with Chrysler Corp. General Electric Co.,
3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 20,436 (FTC 1973). One director had resigned from Chrysler's
board upon receiving notice of the FTC's intention to issue a complaint; however, the
FTC was of the view that there should be a clear understanding of the corporate
responsibility to prevent illegal interlocks. Id. at 20,328. Accordingly, General
Electric was ordered to require, for a period of 5 years, directors and candidate
directors to submit to General Electric a list of principal products manufactured
by other firms of which they are directors. Id. See also Chrysler Corp., 3 TRADE
REG. REP. ff 20,479 (FTC 1974). Similar, though not identical, reporting requirements
had previously been ordered in other cases. See Aluminum Co. of America, 82 F.T.C.
1819 (1973); Aluminum Co. of America, 82 F.T.C. 1814 (1973).
By imposing these reporting requirements in these recent orders, the FTC
has broadened the responsibility of corporations to screen the people they allow to
sit on their corporate boards and to police against the establishment of illegal inter-
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In addition to these enforcement problems, the staff of the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) published a study in 1951, which, like
many previous and subsequent studies, revealed that interlocks of
various types were prevalent in several important industries, had
been so for many years, and all but a few probably could not be reached
by section 8 enforcement. 0 The FTC's survey, sharing a format
typical of many interlock studies, tallied up, for example, 18 competing manufacturers of engines directly or indirectly linked, 6 farm
machinery manufacturers indirectly interlocked, and 10 of the 18
largest machine tool producers linked directly with competitors."'
The central point of the FTC study was that interlocks of several types
were numerous across the economy's industrial and financial landscapes.3 2 This conclusion only served to emphasize the lack of effectiveness of section 8.
A.

Potential Effects of Interlocking Arrangements

More controversial than the number of interlocks uncovered were
the conclusions in the FTC report with respect to the anticompetitive
"fundamental tendencies '5 3 of the different kinds of interlocks which
locks. Compare this relatively new enforcement device with earlier cases using
conventional enforcement methods. See, e.g., United States v. Newmont Mining Corp.,
1966 Trade Cas. fT71,709 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (injunction); United States v. General
Motors Corp., 1965 Trade Cas. ff 71,624 (E.D. Mich. 1965) (injunction) ; United
States v. R. L. Polk & Co., 1955 Trade Cas. 67,993 (E.D. Mich. 1955) (injunction).
It should be noted that Newmont Mining Corporation is among 12 companies in
the energy industry against which the FTC, on June 27, 1974, announced it intended
to issue complaints for alleged violations of section 8 of the Clayton Act and section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). 3 TRADE REG. REP.
I"20,634 (FTC 1974). Final consent orders, with provisions requiring the subject
corporations to engage in self-policing activities in the future, were entered in

July 1975. Standard Oil Co., 3

TRADE REG. REP.

20,876 (FTC 1975).

30. FTC REPORT, supra note 4.
31. Id. at 31.
32. See generally INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT, supra note 4, at
228-29.
33. In summary, these tendencies were:
(2) Interlocking relations between companies in the same or in closely related
industries, but not in competition with each other, may forestall the development
of competition which otherwise would come from normal expansion of the
list of products which they manufacture. (3) Interlocking relations between
companies that face similar problems, for example, the large integrated oil
companies, or between companies in an industry and financial institutions that
are broadly interested in that industry or in related industries, may give rise
to communities of interest and create a united front against any who threaten
habitual relationships or established preeminence. (4) Vertical interlocks may
reach back to companies from which important supplies come and thereby evoke
preferential treatment in the distribution of materials in short supply. (5) Vertical
interlocks may reach forward to companies that consume or distribute the
products of another and thus create preferential access to market outlets. (6) Interlocking relations between manufacturing corporations and financial institutions,
especially banks and insurance companies and a withholding of credit and capital

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol21/iss3/2
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are not covered by section 8." Although director interlocks between
competitors can be held unlawful per se under section 8,35 vertical, i.e.,
supplier-customer, 36 interlocks can also involve a potential for anticompetitive abuse. These interlocks, however, escape the reach of section
8.31 Vertical arrangements may lead to a kind of vertical integration
which, if abused, can be leveraged against nonintegrated producers or
may lead to tie-in sales, s8 understandings on exclusive dealing, 39 or
reciprocity4 ° resulting in the foreclosure of competing suppliers for
sales to the interlocked firms. Similarly, during a period in which
there is a shortage of an essential resource, interlocked firms may find
it easier to obtain supplies not available to competing firms. Thus, a
type of unfair favoritism, arising out of no more than the close relationship among corporate directors, may, under certain conditions,
have important anticompetitive implications. It is important to note,
however, that although these potential problems have been identified,
no empirical study has been made to determine whether they actu41
ally occur.
There are, of course, contrasting opinions about the importance
of vertical interlocks. These opinions range from the notion that
vertical integration in any form cannot injure the competitive process
and that, therefore, vertical interlocks which have the effect of tending
to integrate the relations of two firms should be left alone,42 to the
more realistic view that some vertical interlocking situations may have
anticompetitive potential and should be evaluated on a case-by-case
basis. 43 One observer who subscribes to the latter view opposes an
outright prohibition on vertical interlocks, but does suggest that a system of competitive bidding should be employed when either of the
from their competitors. (7) Interlocking relations may give expression to an
underlying ownership interest and may involve nothing more than a desire to

protect an investment.
FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 23.
It should be noted that this study compiled no hard evidence of actual abuse
in these situations but relied, instead, on the so-called "common-sense" approach to
interlocks, an analytical technique later adopted in INTERLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT, supra note 4, at 6.
34. For the relevant language of section 8, see note 1 supra. See also note 4 and
text accompanying notes 23 & 24 supra.

35. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
36. See note 4 supra.
37. Id.

38. For
at 38-43.
39. For
40. For
41. See

a discussion of tie-in sales, see

ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS, supra

note 4,

a discussion of exclusive dealing agreements, see id. at 43-46.
a discussion of reciprocity arrangements, see id. at 28-30.
Travers, supra note 24, at 853.

42. See Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69
YALE L.J. 1, 24-26 (1959).
43. See id. at 103; Travers, supra note 24, at 860-61, 864.
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interlocked firms account for a critical share of the relevant market."'
Still, all of the theories about the potential effects of vertical interlocking arrangements share a common weakness - there is an absence
of hard evidence on the actual impact of vertical interlocks to support
the conclusions offered.4"
The same is true with respect to interlocking relationships between
competitors through a financial institution.46 This relationship may be
defined as an indirect interlock. 47 In 1951, the FTC found:
[I]nterlocking relations between manufacturing corporations
and financial institutions, notably the commercial banks, constituted the most important series of interlocking relationships found
and also gave rise to the most extensive and apparently significant
of the networks of indirect interlocking relations."8
The possibility cannot be dismissed that the representation of competitors on the same bank boards could lead to exchanges of information between competitors, possible anticompetitive cooperative activities, or to the development of communities of interest strong enough
to handicap nonrepresented companies dependent upon those banks for
essential services. Similarly, the FTC has questioned whether links
between competing firms created by indirect interlocks through banks
may lead to exchanges of competitively sensitive information or provide artificial stimuli for anticompetitive mergers, joint ventures, and
other transfers of corporate power.49
B.

Should All Vertical and Indirect Interlocks
Be Per Se Unlawful?

The potential for the abuse of vertical and indirect interlocking
situations exists, but the critical question is: What, if anything, should
be done about this potential? Is there a need for new legislation broadening the scope of section 8 to make all vertical and indirect interlocks
44. Travers, supra note 24, at 860-61, 864. This bidding system is already
statutorily required for purchases by common carriers where the supplier is vertically
interlocked with the common carrier. Clayton Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 20 (1970).
45. See Travers, supra note 24, at 853.
46. The potential conflicts of interest problems in this area should not be
overlooked. See M. MACE, supra note 6, at 133-44. Professor Mace concluded,
primarily on conflict of interest grounds, "that representatives at investment banking
firms should not serve as members of corporate boards of directors." Id. at 203.
47. See note 4 supra. In contrast, an interlock between a bank and a commercial
corporation to which the bank has extended credit or acts as a depository for the
firm's accounts may, in the absence of similar relationships with the firm's competitors,
be viewed as a vertical interlock. See INTaRLOCKS IN CORPORATE MANAGEMENT,
supra note 4, at 9-10.
48. FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 27.
49. See Hearings on CorporateDisclosure, supra note 25.
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illegal per se? 5 ° Is section 8 currently broad enough to include certain
indirect interlocking arrangements? Can interlocks which fall through
the cracks in section 8 but which restrain trade or constitute unfair
methods of competition be dealt with by enforcement actions under
other provisions of the antitrust laws?
As mentioned earlier, whether these types of interlocking situations should be illegal per se may depend, in part, upon how one
resolves issues unrelated to antitrust.51 But from an antitrust viewpoint, several factors lead the author to believe that, in the absence
of a showing of actual anticompetitive effects, a legislated per se
restriction of all vertical and indirect interlocks is unwarranted.
In recent years, prosecutors have become more imaginative in
their enforcement of section 8 and in the types of remedies imposed
52
to cure section 8 violations. In United States v. Cleveland Trust Co.,
'
with a
the Justice Department relied on a theory of "deputization, 'SS
principal objective being to focus the court's scrutiny on the lawfulness
of the defendant bank's action in placing its personnel on the boards
of directors of competing companies.5 4 The court recognized this to
be a novel theory of section 8 application, first, because it involved
the question of whether a corporation may ever be deemed a director
within the meaning of the statute" and, second, because it involved
50. The FTC has concluded that section 8 of the Clayton Act is deficient in
the following respects:
(1) interlocks formed by officers, directors, employees, or substantial stockholders
of one corporation serving as directors of competing corporations are not
covered; (2) director interlocks between potential competitors, i.e., those firms
which might be competitors, were it not for the existence of the interlocks,
are not covered; (3) vertical director interlocks between customers and suppliers,
particularly borrowers and lenders, are not covered; and (4) indirect horizontal
director interlocks between competing corporations formed by directors serving
simultaneously on the boards of third corporations are not limited by the act.
FTC REPORT, supra note 4, at 13-16. It should be noted that section 1 of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), may, under certain circumstances, reach these situations,
but it is unlikely that the Sherman Act would apply unless the interlock was marked
by some conspiracy, combination, or agreement to restrain trade. See ANTITRUST
DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 4, at 102 n.236, citing United States v. Morgan, 118 F.
Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
51. See text accompanying notes 5-8 supra.
52. 1974-2 Trade Cas. ff 75,278 (N.D. Ohio 1974), consent decree entered,
1975-2 Trade Cas. 60,611 (N.D. Ohio, Nov. 14, 1975).
53. 1974-2 Trade Cas. ff 75,278, at 97,847.
54. Id.
55. Id. The court did not resolve this issue on the Government's motion for
summary judgment. Id. at 97,848. In support of the deputization theory, the
Government relied on decisions holding that under section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(p) (b) (1970), a corporation may be deemed
to sit on the board of directors of another corporation through a deputy. 1974-2
Trade Cas. 1175,278, at 97,847, citing Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1036 (1970), and Marquette Cement Mfg. Co.
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resolution of the issue of whether section 8 applies to directorships in
two parent companies where one of the parents is in competition, both
directly and through one of its own wholly owned subsidiaries, with
a wholly owned subsidiary of the other." The consent decree settling
the case appears to have adopted the Justice Department's innovative
theories as it prohibits the defendant from employing an individual
who is a director of a corporation or a subsidiary engaged in particular
industries if at the same time an officer or employee of the defendant
is already a director of another corporation or subsidiary competing in
one of those industries.

57

Moreover, recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court
make it clear that section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act"'
can reach most, if not all, interlocking arrangements, irrespective of
their legal status under section 8, if it can be shown that they injure
competition or consumers or, if it can be proven that if they are not
cured, there is a strong possibility that they will lead to outright violations of the antitrust laws.5 With few exceptions, therefore, it would
appear that the FTC has the power to deal with specific instances in
which vertical and indirect interlocks are found to be anticompetitive
v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The court ruled that the issue of
deputization is an issue of fact the resolution of which must await trial. 1974-2
Trade Cas. 1"75,278, at 97,847-48.
56. 1974-2 Trade Cas. fT 75,278, at 97,847. The court noted that the case law
on this issue was not definitive. Id., citing Kramer, supra note 28, at 1268 n.ll
(suggesting that section 8 might apply where the major policies of the subsidiaries
are dictated by the parents). The court stated that the question of parent control
was a factual issue which could not be decided on motion for summary judgment.
1974-2 Trade Cas. fT 75,278, at 97,847-48.
57. 1975-2 Trade Cas. ff 60,611 (N.D. Ohio, Nov. 14, 1975).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 4 5(a) (1970). Section 5 provides in pertinent part:
(1) Unfair methods of competition in commerce, or deceptive acts or practices
in commerce, are declared unlawful.
(6) The Commission is empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships,
or corporations, except banks, common carriers subject to the Acts to regulate
commerce, air carriers and foreign air carriers subject to the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958, and persons, partnerships, or corporations insofar as they are
subject to the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, as amended, except as provided
in section 406(b) of said Act, from using unfair methods of competition in
commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce.
Id.
59. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966). In Brown Shoe, the
Supreme Court found in the legislative history of section 5 the congressional intent
to confer upon the FTC the power "to arrest trade restraints in their incipiency
without proof that they amount to an outright violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act
or other provisions of the antitrust laws." Id. at 322 (emphasis added) ; see FTC
v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972); Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC,
381 U.S. 357 (1964) ; FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953) ;
FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948) ; Fashion Originators' Guild of
America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., Inc.,
291 U.S 304 (1934).
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or are found to serve as vehicles for promotion of anticompetitive
activities.6"
Some opponents of an expanded application of the interlock restriction argue that there is now a shortage of qualified directors to sit on

corporate boards and this situation would only be exacerbated by a
blanket prohibition of all vertical and indirect interlocks. 6 There are
also contrary arguments to the effect that this is an "elitist" view and
wholly without merit.6" The arguments on both sides are unconvincing.
First of all, it is undoubtedly true that an outside director can be
an important advisor to management, bringing experience and a
different perspective to the corporate decisionmaking process. Still, it
is not clear that the talents of a prospective outside director would
necessarily be withheld from management if he is not seated on the
company's board. In one instance, a company president, approached
by an investment banker who wanted to be nominated to sit on the
company's board so that he could do a better job for the company,
reportedly responded to the banker with the question: "In what ways
could you do a better job than we are now paying you to do ?63
It is, of course, impossible to generalize accurately about the value
of an outside director on a corporate board. In some companies the
board or directors may only serve to rubberstamp management decisions or enhance the company's image ;64 in others, the board may
make important inputs to the company's decisionmaking processes.
Similarly, one individual outside director may vigorously attempt to
solve company problems, while another outside director may seek only
the prestige of being on a corporate board or the opportunity to
generate new business for his own firm.65 Of course, a working inside
director may be more valuable to the company and its stockholders
than the outside director.
In any event, whether or not there is a shortage of key director
talent and regardless of the value placed on outside director input into
60. Since section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act specifically exempts
banks from its coverage, to the extent that a challenged bank interlock practice is
found to be a banking function, there may be limits on the FTC's power to issue
an order against such practice. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (6) (1970) ; see note 58 supra
for the pertinent text of section 5(a) (6). Similarly, the insurance business is exempt
from federal antitrust law to the extent that such business is regulated by the
several states. Sections 1-5 of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015
(1970). In spite of these exemptions, there is no apparent reason why the FTC
could not challenge the director and any nonexempt commercial corporations with
which the exempt firms are interlocked.

61. See J. SCOTT & E.
1967, at 52 (1967).

ROCKEFELLER,

ANTITRUST

AND

TRADE

REGULATION

TODAY:

62. See generally Travers, supra note 24, at 835-38.
63. M. MACE, supra note 6, at 152.
64. Id. at 107.
65. Id. at 105-06.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1976

13

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 3 [1976], Art. 2

VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

21: p. 393

corporate processes, the issue is whether the antitrust laws should
intervene to prohibit the seating of outside directors who may be in
vertical or indirect interlocking situations. If a vertical or indirect
interlock is causing identifiable anticompetitive effects, its existence
cannot be justified by a talent shortage. It must be dissolved. Conversely, if a vertical or indirect interlock is not demonstrably anticompetitive, it would, from an antitrust law standpoint, be acceptable even
if qualified directors could be found in abundance.
IV.

FTC

ACTIVITIES RESPECTING INTERLOCKS

As FTC Chairman Engman noted in his recent congressional
statement,66 the recent publication of Disclosure of Corporate Ownership67 and the publication of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Institutional Investor Study Report 8 have highlighted the
importance of knowing more about the effects of interlocking arrangements. As one would expect in our complex business community, these
publications have shown that, apart from interlocking directorates and
other personnel relationships, large financial institutions and major
corporations are intertwined in a variety of business relationships.6 '
In some cases, the same commercial bank that is represented on a company's board of directors is also a substantial creditor of the company;
serves as a depository of its commercial accounts; manages its employee
pension funds; and, through its trust department, is a major holder of
the company's stock. Some commercial banks may even share these
various business relationships with companies which are competitors
in particular markets. Under these circumstances, the institutional
interlock may increase the economic leverage of financial institutions
70
in the decisionmaking process of competing firms.
While there is the strong possibility that a number of the abovedescribed corporate interlocks could be the bases for anticompetitive
activities, there are no analytical models from which to draw conclusions; nor has hard evidence of anticompetitive effects of these
relationships been produced in the last 50 years.7" Yet, recent studies
66. See Hearings on CorporateDisclosure, supra note 25.
67. DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP, supra note 4.
68. H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). This study was based
primarily on data gathered from questionnaires and interviews and investigated the
purchase, sale, and holding of securities by all types of institutional investors in
order to measure the impact of such activities upon the securities market and upon
the public interest. Id. pt. 1, at v.
69. See, e.g., DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP, supra note 4, at 385-91.
70. Id. at 387-89.
71. See notes 4, 33, 41 & 45 and accompanying text supra.
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have shown that these types of interlocks exist in large numbers, 72 and
common sense does suggest that under certain business pressures and
circumstances, these interlocking arrangements could lead to abuses.
One cannot, therefore, simply assume that these intercorporate affiliations have no significant effect on corporate conduct.7 3
The degree to which commercial banks and other financial institutions are able to and actually do influence individual or industrywide corporate decisions, and the implications of such influence, are
issues which, according to Chairman Engman, 74 the FTC's Bureau of
Competition has been examining in detail. In addition, the FTC
staff is reviewing interlocking personnel relationships between financial
institutions and energy companies and between competing energy companies in conjunction with an analysis of other business relationships."5
One objective of its inquiry will be to determine whether or not indirect or vertical interlocks lead to reciprocal dealing and tying arrangements. 76 The study also involves an examination of the following
aspects of the energy industries: borrowing-financial relationships; the
holding of debt; the deposits of commercial accounts; and the holding and voting of stock in energy companies.7" An effort will be
made to ascertain the role of linked personnel in bringing about these
other relationships. 78 Indirect and vertical interlocks between energy
companies and financial institutions will be considered in order to
determine whether they lead to discrimination in financing and borrowing patterns. 79 Additionally, an effort will be made to determine
the functions of linked personnel and their role in particular business
transactions.8 0 The study group will also attempt to ascertain whether
linked financial institutions play any significant role in bringing
about mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, and corporate takeovers.8 '
72. See, e.g., Dooley, supra note 27, at 315. Professor Dooley's study showed
that the number of interlocking directorates of the top 200 nonfinancial and the 50
largest financial corporations has increased slightly from 1935 to 1965. Id. The study
also indicated that one out of eight interlocks surveyed involved companies within the
same five digit SIC product class. Id. at 319 n.8. From that observation, Professor
Dooley reached the dubious conclusion that these interlocks also involved companies
which were competitors. Id. at 319.
73. See generally F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 47 (1970).
74. See Hearings on Corporate Disclosure, supra note 25, at 897-912.
75. See note 25 supra. See also Address by James T. Halverson entitled "Inter-

locking Directors - A Government View," Loyola College Executive Seminar,
April 8, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Halverson] (copy on file at the Villanova Law
Review).
76. Halverson, supra note 75; see notes 38 & 40 supra
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.

80. Id.
81. Id.
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Further, the issue of whether or not institutional interlocks lead to
exchanges of information between competitors or access to information contained in credit files of noninterlocked competitors will be
examined. 2 This undertaking, if published, should provide a detailed
analysis of the actual, as distinguished from the speculative, effects of
direct and indirect interlocking relationships in at least one significant
sector of the economy.
Finally, the findings in the publication of Disclosure of Corporate Ownership13 suggest that the Government does not require
sufficient corporate disclosure to enable it to comprehend and evaluate
the implications of corporate ownership and control or to monitor
existing prohibitions on interlocking directorates.8 4
At the present time, interlock information is difficult for private
companies, as well as the Government, to obtain with any degree of
reliability. The corporate counsel evaluating a prospective director,
or the government researcher, at present, must prepare a base list of
possible interlocks. Corporate counsel may usually ask questions
directly of the prospective director, but since federal agencies' records
seldom contain the information from which to compile such a list,
enforcement authorities must rely on trade journals, newspapers, and
business publications for such information. An alternative approach
involves the examination of public sources such as Standard & Poors
Register of Corporations,Directors, and Executives or Dun & Bradstreet Million Dollar Directory. These sources, however, do not agree
in many instances as to the composition of corporate boards and do
not link directors of certain companies to enough of the companies'
product lines. While the files of the Securities and Exchange Commission are another source of public data, the examination of individual
files and the cross-referencing of personnel lists are both time-consuming and inefficient.
The second step in the interlock search involves a detailed analysis
of the business operations of the interlocked corporations to determine if such corporations are competitors within the meaning of section
8 of the Clayton Act. As noted, those public sources presently available
are vague, inconsistent, and lack sufficient detail to make possible a
thorough determination of the extent to which the interlocked corporations compete with one another.
82. Id.
83. DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP,

supra note 4.

84. Id. at 9-11.
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For these reasons, the FTC staff is considering a proposal to require a simple annual interlock and ownership report,8 5 pursuant to
section 6(b) of the FTC Act."6 The FTC staff believes that the
required submission of such annual reports could alleviate the deficiencies in present investigatory procedures; place the burden of monitoring interlocks on the corporations themselves at minimal cost to each
corporation; and, in general, provide an efficient, detailed, one-step
investigatory procedure.8 7 Such a reporting requirement could provide
a method of consistent and continuing interlock review by corporate
counsel, as well as by enforcement authorities. Assuming that the reporting form is kept simple, the reporting requirement could establish,
for the first time, one public source for corporate counsel to check
when screening the other relationships of an individual being considered
for a directorship. It appears that the FTC staff proposal is presently
under consideration by the FTC. If this procedure is proposed by
the FTC, it is hoped that the FTC would, prior to implementation,
seek comments specifically from those affected to ensure that the
formalities involved conform to the FTC staff's stated intention of
creating a simple form which imposes as little burden as possible on
corporations, while, at the same time, ensuring that the final product
will be useful to the private sector and Government alike.
V.

CONCLUSION

Absent as yet unavailable in-depth factual studies, the antitrust
laws applicable to interlocking directorates appear to be appropriately interpreted by the courts and to have adequate breadth to allow
for non-per se law enforcement when particular fact situations, involving
other than horizontal interlocks, demand action.
85. See Hearings on Corporate Disclosure, supra note 25; Halverson, supra
note 75.

86. 15 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1970).
87. See Halverson, supra note 75.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1976

17

